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UNITED STATES ASYLUM PROCEDURES: CURRENT
STATUS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The United States has a long-standing tradition of being a
haven for oppressed peoples of the world.' In keeping with that tra-
dition, U.S. immigration laws provide several methods that enable
foreigners to gain admission into the country. 2 Unfortunately,
American officials charged with designing and implementing foreign
policy have been selective in extending welcome to foreigners. 3 Nar-
row judicial review of official immigration policy and procedure has
usually allowed such discrimination to prevail.4
I When our nation was in its infancy. Ellis Island was a welcome sight to our
European forefathers.
Give me your tired. jour poor,
)'our huddled masses.reaming to breathe free.
The wretched refuse ofyour teeming shore.
Send these. the homeless. tempest-tost to me
I lite mi lamp beside the golden door!
From The New Colossus, an 1883 Emma Lazarus poem affixed to the Statue of Liberty.
The U.S. admitted 47,601.208 immigrants between the years 1820-1976. E. HARPER.
IMMIGRATION LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 98 (1978 Supp.). Congress recently reset
the number of refugees who may be admitted yearly into the United States at 50.000.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212. § 207. 94 Stat. 102 (to be codified in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1157).
2. See notes 19-21 infra and accompanying text.
3. This is apparent in the United States' asylum policies. While the U.S. has been
receptive to refugees of communist countries seeking asylum, it has been less willing to
accept refugees from noncommunist countries, particularly if those countries' dictator-
ships are on friendly terms with the U.S. Government. For example, the U.S. govern-
ment has not warmly welcomed refugees from Iran. Chile. the Philippines. Haiti. and
other repressive noncommunist countries. See Note. Behind the Paper Curtait" Asylum
Policy Versus ,4sYlum Practice, 7 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc. CHANGE 107, 124-26 (1978).
In a related development, there are unrebutted allegations that the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) is violating the immigration statutes as it processes the
claims of El Salvadoran refugees who are fleeing the political turmoil now raging in that
small Central American country. Those close to the situation charge that INS officials
are purposefully failing to advise the El Salvadorans of their rights and opportunities
under the immigration statutes, including the right to have a deportation hearing and to
apply for political asylum. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 2. 1981. at Al, col 2.
4. Congress vested jurisdiction to review final orders of deportation exclusively in
the courts of appeal. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. § 106(a), 8 U.S.C.
§ ! 105a(a) (1976). The issue ofjudicial review of the INS most frequently arises in con-
nection with denials of aliens' requests for withholding of deportation. See note 20t nra.
The courts have limited their review of discretionary administrative action to ques-
tions whether the applicant has been accorded procedural due process, whether the exer-
cise of administrative discretion has been arbitrary and capricious, and whether the
decision was reached in accordance with applicable rules of law. Henry v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., 552 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1977); Paul v. Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv., 521 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Shaughnessy. 218 F.2d 316 (2d
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The plight of Haitian aliens who are unsuccessful in their
attempts to obtain political asylum5 in the United States is capturing
the media's attention.6 Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS)7 authorities, supported by Department of State officials," con-
sistently choose to deny the Haitians' asylum requests." In the
(Or 1954) See generalh Note. Judicial Rerie. of.4dministraiie Stars of Deportoiow
,Setion 24,4h, of the Immigraiton and Nattonalay.4rt of lQS.Z 119761 WASH U. L.Q. 59.
5 An application for asylum is a form of administrative relief that has the effect, if
grantcd. of permitting an alien to remain in the United States. Eligibility for political
as,,lum precludes deportation or exclusion. 44 Fed. Reg. 21.255 (1979).
An alien is deportable if he has violated his immigration status or his penod of admis-
sion has expired. Deportable aliens include aliens who enter the U.S. without inspection.
b<Lomc institutionalized at public expense. are convicted of a cnme involving moral tur-
piiude. or arc in violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952. § 241(a1-4). 8 U.S.C. § 1251(aX1-4) (1976j An alien is exclud-
able if he does not possess the proper documents necessary to enter this country. Exclud-
able aliens include alicns who are insane, afflicted with an'. dangerous contagious
disease, narcotic drug addicts. vagrints. polygamists. or likely at any time to become
public charges Id § 212(a). 8 U SC § 1182(a) (1976).
NsNlum status is granted for one year from the date of approal. renevable annually.
45 Fed Reg 37.394 (1980)
6 The spring of 1980 %%itncssed a mass exodus of Cubans and Haitians from their
homelands Thousands drow4ned in the crossing to Flonda %hen their overloaded. ill-
equipped boats and rafts capsized Many others died of staration and disease. See. e.g..
N Y Times. May 8. 1980. at A13. col 1;id. May 14. 1980at A]. col 3.id. May 27. 1980.
At Al. col 4
This Note will discuss at length the details of a program that the INS instituted in 1978
to effect the mass deportation of Haitian refugees seeking political asylum in the United
States See notes 44-52 mfra and accompanying text. That program formally ended
seseral months later Ahen the Haitians brought suit in district court. See notes 53-63
1fra and accompanying text. However. .cry recently, the immigration authorities in
Miami hase again begun mass deportation proceedings against nc.iy arrived Haitians.
processing 35 cases a day in locked courtrooms from which prisate lawyers have been
barred. See N.Y. Times. June 6. 1981. at 7. col. 1.
7 The Attorne) General has delegated to the INS Commissioner the major respon-
sibility for the administration of the immigration laws. 8 C.FR. § 2.1 (1981). The INS's
primary functions include enforcing the immigration laws (by preventing illegal migra-
tion into the United States and by expelling those who have entered and do not have a
legal nght to remain) and providing services relating to the benefits available to eligible
immigrants. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. § 103(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)
(1976)
8 The Department of State and its consular officers are officially charged with issu-
ing or refusing visas to aliens wishing to come to the United States. The responsibilities
of the Secretary of State and consular officers in the administration of the immigration
laws are descnbed in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. §§ 104. 221(g). 8
U SC. §§ 1104. 1201(g) (1976).
The Department of State organized a mission to Haiti for the purpose of reviewing the
treatment of Haitians upon their forced return to their homeland. The Department
planned to use the gathered information when it reviewed Haitians" claims for political
asylum See Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti. No. 79-2086 (S.D. Fla.). appeal dock.
eted. No 80-5683 (5th Cir. 1980). slip op. at 57-80.
9. The unconditional and absolute denials of Haitians' requests for asylum were
based on the INS's and the Department of State's conviction that the Haitians are eco-
nomic escapees rather than political refugees. See Dernis. Haitian Immigrants: Political
Re/uigees or Economic E£.capee.r 31 U. MiAMI L. Riv. 27 (1976). See Seperallr N.Y.
Times. May 8. 1980. at A12, col. 3.
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recently decided case Haitian Refugee Center v. CMi/etti, 1o the South-
ern District Court of Florida condemned the INS for implementing
a program in 1978 that was designed to expedite the deportation of
Haitian aliens.I I The court's extensive inquiry and findings corrobo-
rated allegations of INS abuse of its discretionary authority to gran!
or deny the aliens' asylum claims. 2
Under the terms of the Protoc.l Relating to the Status of Refugees. done Jan. 31. 197.
19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577. 606 U.N.T.S. 2681 [hereinafter cited as Protocol) "'rcf-
ugees" are to be admitted into the United States. Id art. I(I). The United States
acceded to the Protocol on Nov. i. 1968. See note 21 infra and accompanying text. The
Protocol's definition of a refugee (quoted in note 65 infra) does not address itself to "eco-
nomic" refugee.. An alien who flees due to extreme poverty who does not fall within the
definition of refugee is not entitled to entry. In the past. the United States' administrative
and judicial bodies have ruled disfavorably upon applications in which an alien's allega-
tions of political persecution disguised an economic or other disqualifying motive..5"v.
e.g.. In re Janus and Janck. 12 1. & N. Dec. 866 (BIA 1968): In re Pierre. 15 I. & N. Dec.
461 (BIA 1975). Paul v. Immigration & Naturalization Sery.. 531 F.2d 194 (5th Cir
1975); Gena v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.. 424 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1970).
Our nation's Haitian policy is severely criticized as unrealistic. discriminatory, and
inhumane. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs, after pointing out the difference in
treatment accorded Cuban and Haitian aliens, has charged that the Haitians were "vic-
tims of a clear double standard." N.Y. Times. May 6. 1980. at Al. col. I. The Congres-
sional Black Caucus has charged "that the Administration had engaged in racism and
*deliberate deceit' in its treatment of [the Haitians]." Id. May 8. 1980. at A13. col 1. It
was reported that Lane Kirkland, president of the AFL-CIO. told a news conference that
competition for jobs by Cuban and Haitian refugees should not be used as a justification
for not admitting them to the United States. Id
In a lead editorial, the New York Times editors could not understand the difference in
treatment accorded Cuban and Haitian aliens. "There is not much refuge to be found in
legalistic distinctions between politics and economics, between brave protesters and igno-
ble wetbacks." Id, Apr. 16. 1980. at A26. col. I. See also Note. Due Process Rights/or
Excludable Alies Under United State-f Immigration Law and the United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Rejugees-Haitian Aliens A Case in Point. 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.
& POL. 203 (1977); Note. PoliicalAsrl/um in the United State. A Failure of tuman Rights
Policy 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 133 (1977-1978); N.Y. Times. May 2. 1980. at A14, col. 6. id.
May 13, 1980. at A14, col. 5: id. Dec. 6. 1979. at A26. col. 4; id. Oct. 25. 1979. at A19.
col. 2.
10. No. 79-2086 (S.D. Fla.).appealdocketed, No. 80-5683 (5th Cir. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Opinion) (on file at the Cornell International Law Journal). The court conducted
an unprecedented review of INS policy and procedure. providing a stunning exception to
the widely recognized policy of narrow judicial review of immigration policy and proce-
dure. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. The government's appeal has been
"expedited" so that oral arguments will be scheduled promptly after the court receives all
of the appellate briefs in April 198 1. A decision should be forthcoming in the summer of
1981.
I1. For a description of the "Haitian Program." see notes 43-51 ifra and accompa-
nying text.
12. In June 1980 the Department of State announced that the arrival of Cub and
Haitian refugees during the spring of 1980 created an emergency situation in southern
Florida. See Cuban-Haitian Arrivals in U.S.. United States Department of State. Current
Policy No. 193, June 20, 1980, reprinted in 57 INTERPRErER RELEASES 312 (1980). Con-
gress responded to the crisis announcement by promising legislation that would accord
special treatment to Cuban and Haitian aliens. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.)
introduced the bill into the Senate on August 5. 1980. 126 CONG. RECS. 10,825 (daily ed.
Aug. 5, 1980). Congress took no action on the bill during the remainder of the session: as
of this writing,- Sen. Kennedy has not reintroduced the bill into the 97th Congress.
1981]
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Periodic revision of INS administrative regulations 3 has served
to curtail some potential for INS abuse of its discretionary authority.
But the Haitian Refugee Center decision indicates the urgent need for
additional structuring and checking of INS discretion. 4 This Note
will foc'us on the exercise of discretion in IN1S asylum procedures. It
will begin with a brief description of the INS administrative organi-
zation and its asylum procedures. 5 Then the Note will evaluate cur-
rent asylum regulations in light of the evidence presented and the
court's holding in Haitian Refugee Center.'6 The Note closes with
four proposals for reform.' 7 It argues for a structural separation of
the service and enforcement functions of the INS; revision of current
asylum regulations; preparation of national reports that will accu-
rately reflect the internal climate of each nation from which asylum
applicants seek refuge; and the formation of a- Permanent Task
Force on Refugee Policy charged with monitoring INS activities.
ASYLUM PROCEDURES
A. BACKGROUND
The original version of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 '8 recognized no right of asylum for persons seeking entry into
the United States. However, immigration officials regularly used
administrative and statutory dispensations to provide aliens with a
haven from persecution, torture, or disaster in their homelands.' 9
After the Department of State announcement, the INS reclassified all Cubans and Hai-
tians who were in INS proceedings as of June 19. 1980. as -Cuban/Haitian (status pend-
ing)" and renewed their parole status for a six month penod. In anticipation of
legislation that would cover their situation, the INS extended their parole status until
July 15, 1981. 58 INTERPRETER RELEAsES 47 (1981).
13. See notes 24-25 infra and accompanying texL
14. In March 1980 Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 with the primary inten-
tion of establishing a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission and resettle-
ment ofrefugees in the United States. Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L No. 96-212. 94 Stat.
102 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Refugee Act].
By this legislation Congress did not undertake a reform of U.S. asylum practices.
However, in the Act Congress instructed the Attorney General to establish asylum proce-
dures. thus statutorily authorizing asylum relief for the first time. Id § 208(b) (to be
codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1158). See notes 18-25 infra andaccompanying text.
15. See notes 18-28 ktfra and 'accompanying text.
16. See notes 63-85 infra and accompanying text.
17. See notes 87-113 infra and accompanying text.
IS. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1507 (1976).
19. See generally I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCE-
DURE § 2.3(i) (1980). The two primary mechanisms were the Seventh Preference condi-
tional entry provision and the Attorney General's parole power. Pursuant to the
Seventh Preference conditional entry provision (Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, § 203(a)(7). 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7) (1976)). the INS allocated immigrant visas in an
order of preference. The Seventh Preference provided for the conditional entry of per-
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Moreover, Congress permitted aliens' deportation to be withheld if
the aliens would be subject to persecution in their native countries
when deported.20 There existed similar international support not to
sons who, because of persecution or fear of persecution. fled communist countres or the
Middle East region. Id This preference included persons displaced by natural disasters
or calamities.
By its recent amendment of the immigration legislation Congress abolished the Sev-
enth Preference for conditional entry. Refugee Act. supra note 14. § 203(cX3) (to be
codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1153). Congress established a separate annual allocation for the
adrhission of refugees. The annual limitation on regular refugee admissions is currently
set at 50.000. 'fter the fiscal year 1982. the President is authorized to determine the
number of refugees who may be admitted each ye- After appropriate consultation with
Congress, the President is also authorized to admit any additional refugees -of special
humanitarian concern to the United States." Id § 201(b) (to be codified in 8 US.C
§ 1157).
Pursuant to the Attorney General's parole power (Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952. § 212(d)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1976)), the Attorney General had authority to
admit any refugee who was fleeing from any form of government "for emergency reasons
or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest." Id. § 212(d)(5). 8 U.S.C. §
1182(d)(5) (1976). The Act did not place geographic or ideological restrictions on the
beneficiaries of the parole provision. In theory, the parole provision provided flexibility
to redress discimination that existed in favor of refugees from communism. In practice.
parole was yeI another means of admitting persons fleeing communism. This provision
was used to admit groups of persons from Hungary. Cuba. Czechoslovakia. and South
Vietnam. See Note, Behind the Paper Curain:. Asylum Polic- kersus AsYlum Practice. 7
N.Y.U REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 107, 127 (1978). In the 1980 legislation. Congress
greatly restricted the authority of the Attorney General to exercise his parole power.
Parole can no longer be used to admit groups of refugees.
The Attorney General may not parole into the United States an alien who is a
refugee unless the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons in the
public interest with respect to that particular alien require that the alien be
paroled into the United States rather than be admitted as a refugee under section
207.
Refugee Act, s-pra note 14. § 203(f) (to be codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1182). Section 207
pertains to the number of refugees who may be admitted under normal and under emer-
gency conditions. See generally I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD. IMMIGRATION LAW
AND PROCEDURE § 2.54 (1980); Note. Political Asylum In the United States: .4 Failure of
Human Rights Policy, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 133. 14-42 (1977).
20. In its original version, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 gave the
Attorney General authority to withhold an alien's deportation to a country where he
would be subject to physical persecution. In 1965, Congress eliminated the reference to
physical persecution, but conditioned relief on the alien's showing that he would be sub-
ject to persecution "on account of race, religion, or political opinion." Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976).
In the Refugee Act of 1980, Congress further amended this provision to make the
Attorney General's act mandatory instead of discretionary, to more closely conform the
statutory language to the United Nations' definition of "refugee," and to preclude this
benefit if an alien fell into one of four disfavored classes.
The four disfavored classes include aliens who the Attorney General determines (1)
participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality.
membership in a particular social group, br political opinion. (2) were convicted of a
particularly serious crime, (3) committed serious nonpolitical crimes outside the U.S.
prior to their arrival in the U.S.. and (4) constitute a danger to U.S. security. Id § 203(e)
(to be codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1251).
The revised section provides in part:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien. . .to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would be
1981]
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expel aliens who would be persecuted or penalized upon their forced
return.:"
One of the first significant steps toward official recognition of an
alien's right to asylum came in 1970. Public opposition to the U.S.
government's forced return of a Lithuanian seaman 22 prompted the
Department of State to issue a statement establishing a general pol-
icy for handling future asylum requests.2 3 In 1974 the INS Commis-
sioner promulgated the first set of asylum regulations.2 4 Finally, in
March 1980, Congress codified the right to asylum for refugees in the
threatened in such country on account of race. religion. nationality. membership
in a particular social group. or political optnion.
Id For a thorough discussion of the possible ramifications of the revised § 243(h) see
Note. Section 24.31hi of the Immigration and Nationaht. Act of 10.2 as .4mended b)" the
Re/u-ee Act of 1980, .4 Prognosis and a Proposal. 13 CORNELL IVtL /.J. 291 (1980)
Ihereinafter cited as Note). See also note 26 tifta.
21 In 1969. the United States acceded to a United Nations Protocol that prohibits
the deportation of a refugee -to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom
%ould be threatened on account of his race. religion. nationality. membership of a partic-
ular social group or political opinion." Protocol. .srpra note 9. art. 33. At the time of
passage. Congress and the Executive understood that the Protocol would not affect the
existing United States policy or require an amendment to the statute. See Letter of
Transmittal to the Senate. August 1. 1968, Exec. Doc. K. 90th Cong.. 2d Sess. at III
reprinted in The Presidents ,4essage to the Senate Recommending its .4dvice and Consent
to the Protocol 4 WEEKLY COMP. O PRES. Doc. 1187 (Aug. 1. 1968).
There has been some debate in the courts and in the literature over the effect of these
United Nations documents upon United States" immigration law and policies. See. e.g..
In re Dunar. 14 1. & N. Dec. 310 (BIA 1973) (Article 33 has effected no substantial
changes in the application of § 243(h)); Pierre v. United States, 547 F.2d 1281. 1287-89
(5th Cir. 1977); Ming v. Marks, 367 F. Supp. 673. 677-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). ad. 505 F.2d
1170 (2d Cir. 1974). cert. dented. 421 U.S. 911 (1975) (Convention does not alter or
enlarge the effect of existing immigration laws). Kan Kam Lin s. Rinaldi. 361 F. Supp.
177. 185-86 (D.C.N.J. 1973). afl'd. 493 F.2d 1229. cert. deniea4 419 U.S. 874 (1974) (terms
of the Protocol coextensive with orthodox theories of present immigration laws). Com-
pare the court's position in Coriolan v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.. 559 F.2d 993
(5th Cir. 1977).
We do not suggest that the Protocol profoundly alters American refugee law.
We do believe that our adherence to the Protocol reflects or even augments the
seriousness of this country's commitment to humanitarian concerns, even in this
stern field of law.
559 F.2d 993, 997. See generally Frank. Effect of the 1967 UnitedNations Protocol on the
Status of Refugees in the United States. II INr'L LAw. 291 (1977).
22. For a detailed account of the seaman's forced return, see .4ttempted Defecton br
Lithuanian Seaman. Sinas Kudirka- Hearing Before the Subcomnx on State Dept' Organ-
ization and Foreign Operations of the House Comm on Forgrn .4ffairs. 91st Cong.. 2d
Sess. 216 (1970). See also N.Y. Times, Dec. 2. 1970. at 10. coL 1.
23. See Department of State. New Guidance Reinforces United States Policy on ,4s)-
lum, 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 124 (1972).
24. 8 C.F.R. § 108 (1975). These regulations have been periodically revised, most
recently in June 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 37.392 (1980). Congress has assigned the major
immigration enforcement responsibilities to the Attorney General. Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, § 103.8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1976). Pursuant to congressional author-
ization, the Attorney General has, in turn, delegated most of the immediate supervisory
responsibility to the INS Commissioner. Id. § 103(a) 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1976). The
Commissioner has no independent statutory authority. He exercises such duties and
responsibilities in the administration of the INS and the statute as are assigned to him by
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United States and at ports of entry. 5
I Asylum regulations have emerged as an administrative response
to pressures from the public and the Executive who perceived the
existing framework to be inadequate and inhumane. 26 The regula-
the Attorney General. Id. § 103(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1103(b) (1976). He may issue regulations
deemed necessary or appropriate for the exercise of this authority. 8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (1981).
The Commissioner also promulgates -Operating Instructions- that direct INS employ-
ecs in the proper performance of their duties. The Commissioner revised the Operating
Instructions pertaining to the implementation of asylum procedures after the Attorney
General issued the new regulations in June 1980. The new Operating Instructions may
be obtained upon request from any INS District Office.
25. Refugee Act of 1980, note 14.rupra. The !;.bisative history explains that the Ref-
ugee Act establishes a comprehensive United States refugee resettlement and assistance
policy. "[T]he bill establishes an asylum provision in the Immigration and Nationality
Act for the first time by improving and clarifying the procedures for determining asylum
claims filed by aliens." S. REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980).
The Refugee Act provides in part:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically present
in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such
alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be granted asylum in the
discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney General determines that such
alien is a refugee.
Refugee Act, sutpra note 14. § 201(b) (to be codified in 8 U.S.C. § 1158).
Congress required the Attorney General to establish the asylum procedures no later
than June 1980. Id § 204(dX2). The INS published interim regulations on June 2, 1980.
45 Fed. Reg. 37,393 (1980).
26. A sense of dissatisfaction prompted the recent legislation. The Refugee Act of
1980, which required the Attorney General to issue new asylum regulations, was enacted
to "[g]ive statutory meaning to our national commitment to human rights and humanita-
rian concerns, not reflected in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952." S. REP.
No. 256, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980). See note 25 supra. The legislation now offers two
basic forms of relief: asylum and the withholding of deportation. References in the reg-
ulations and in the statute relating to applications for asylum and to requests for the
withholding of deportation are deceptively similar and understandably confusing. How-
ever much they appear to overlap, the two provisions are distinct and implicate separate
procedures.
The two relief measures may be distinguished in part by their statutory history. A
provision for the Attorney General's power to withhold deportation if he felt an alien
would be subject to persecution after being deported has been a part of the immigration
statutory scheme since 1952. See note 20 supra. Asylum provisions were only later
developed and administered informally during 1974-1980. Congress codified the asylum
provision in 1980 and formally requested the Attorney General to issue appropriate regu-
lations. See ncte 25 supra.
The two measures may be distinguished procedurally as well Regulations prescribe
that every alien who is the subject of a deportation hearing must be advised of his right to
apply for the temporary withholding of deportation to a country that a special inquiry
officer, i e., the Immigration Judge, selects. The application consists of the alien's state-
ment setting forth reasons in support of his request. 8 C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1981). Under
the recently amended § 243(h) of the Act, the deportable alien bears the burden of prov-
ing that his "life or freedom would be threatened" by deportation. The practical effect of
the amendment on the alien's burden of proof is discussed in Note, supra note 20, at 298-
301. The Board of Immigration Appeals and the courts of appeal may review the Immi-
gration Judge's decision to withhold deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 242.21 (1981). In the past.
"the breadth of the Attorney General's discretion under prior law rendered judicial
review deferential, if not ineffective." Note, supra note 20, at 302. Language changes
deleting the Attorney General's broad discretionary power suggest that judicial review of
these decisions should become less deferential. See id at 296-98.
19811
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tions continue to allow asylum decisionmakers much discretion in
deciding asylum claims. 27 Throughout its period of statutory and
regulatory development, neither the INS, the Executive, nor the
courts have seriously challenged the discretionary nature of the asy-
lum grant.2a
B. PRE-1979 REGULATIONS
Asylum regulations that were in effect until April 1979 - 9 author-
Eligbility and application for asylum are determined pursuant to a separate set of
regulations. See 45 Fed. Reg. 37.395 (1980) (cc.ifid in 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (1981)). The
asylum regulations provide that an alien may submit an application for asylum at any
time before, during. or after a deportation or exclusion hearing. ,d § 208.3. The right to
apply for political asylum does not preclude an alien from requesting to hive his depor-
tation withheld in a subsequent exclusion or deportation hearing. 8 C.F.R. § 208.11
(198 1). For a detailed analysis of the asylum regulations, past and present, see notes 29-
42 & 64-85 t./Ta and accompanying text.
Asylum and withholding of deportation are distinct benefits for which eligible aliens
may apply. Conceptual distinctions between asylum and withholding of deportation blur
shen the application for asylum is submitted during a deportation hearing. Under the
old regulations, the asylum request was merged into a request for withholding of depor-
tation. (8 C.F.R. § 108.3 (1980)). In the newest regulations. an asylum request submitted
during a deportation proceeding is not expressly transformed into a § 243(h) claim.
Apparently the two claims remain distinct. See 45 Fed. Reg. 37. 395 (1980) (codified in 8
C.FR. § 208.10 (1981)).
For additional clarification of this confusing procedural scheme, see I C. GoRDON &
H. ROSENFIELD. IMMIGRATION LAW AND PAOCEDURE § 2_24AfM IA 41, §§ 5.16b. 5.8 f(2)(1980). See also In re McMullen, 17 1. & N. Dec. 213 (Int. Dec. No. 2831. BIA 1980). in
which the Board applied the amended §§ 208 and 243(h) to a Northern Irishman's claim
for political asylum and for withholding of deporation.
27. See notes 29-38, 67-80 n/ta.
28. Courts have refused to review this exetcise of discretion, because the pertinent
regulations have always provided that the District Director's decision was unreviewable.
8 C.F.R. § 108.2 (1980). See Chen Chaun-Fa v. Kiley. 459 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Courts have merely reminded the alien that he can apply.for a withholding of deporta-
tion pursuant to Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. § 243(h). 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(1976). See. e.g.. Zamora v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.. 534 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir.
1976); Fleurinor v. Immigration & Naturalization Scrv.. 585 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1978):
Chen Chaun-Fa v. Kiley, 459 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
In Fleurhor, when asked to review the denial of § 243(h) relief, the court deferred to
the legislative branch's prerogative in the field:
The establishment of requirements for entry into the United States is a political
decision which rests with Congress. Efforts being made to influence or change
the laws relative to Haitians coming to our country are properly directed toward
the legislative branch. The fuiction of the judiciary is to rule in accordance with
these legislative mandates.
585 F.2d at 134. See also Henry v. Immigration & Naturalization Scrv., 552 F.2d 130
(5th Cir. 1977): "We by no means intend to belittle claims of political persecution. in
Haiti or other lands. Our sadness at all circumscriptions of freedom, however, is no
charter to disregard the procedural system created to determine the merit of such
claims." Id at 132.
29. A description of the pre-1979 regulations is intended to prepare the reader for the
discussion of iaitian Reifgee Center . Civilefi that follows. Handed down in 1980. the
court based its decision on the asylum regulations as they existed in 1978 when the INS
implemented-a specially designed program to expedite the deportation of Haitian aliens.
See notes 43-51 h Oa and accompanying text.
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ized the INS District Director" to decide all asylum claims whether
submitted before or during a deportation hearing.3t The District
Director classified the claim as either clearly. meritorious, clearly
lacking in substance, or doubtful 32 Only if he labelled the claim
doubtful did the District Director request the views of the Depart-
ment of State.3 3 The District Director's decision was not appeala-
ble.34
Significantly, the regulations failed to provide any guidelines for
the District Director. They did not indicate the burden of proof that
an alien had to meet,3 5 the type of evidence the District Director
should consider, 36 or the information he was to provide applicants
when he communicated his decision. 37 The regulations were also
conspicuously silent about the procedural requirements that would
govern the application process.38
30. The regulations authorize District Directors to grant or deny any application or
petition submitted to the INS, to initiate any authorized proceeding in their respective
districts, to issue orders to show cause, and to terminate any authorized proceeding with-
out regard to geographical limitations. 8 C.F.R. § 103.1(n) (1981).
31. 8 C.F.R. § 108.1 (1979). The regulations required the applicant to appear per-
sonally before an immigration officer before adjudication of his application. Id § 108.2.
For a descnption of the general stages of the deportation hearing, see E. HARPER. supra
note 1, at 606-I1.
32. Id Operating Instructions 108.1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as O.1.J.
33. 8 C.F.R. § 108.2 (1979). Where approval or denial was not clearly warranted, the
District Director sent a copy of the alien's written statement or a summary of his oral
statement and supporting evidence to the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs of the
Department of State for its consideration. The Director took no further action until he
received the Office's views. When the Office recommended the claim be granted and the
District Director decided adversely, the claim was certified to the Regional Commis-
sioner for final decision. Id
34. Id If the District Director denied asylum, toe alien could still apply for with-
holding of deportation under § 243(h) of the Act (see note 23 supra) and for the benefits
of Article 33 of the Protocol. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. '.
35. The Operating Instructions merely indicated that if the District Director was
"satisfied as to the validity of an alien's contention that he would be subject to persecu-
tion if he returns to his home country," then the Director could grant to the alien an
extension of stay or an adjustment of status. 0.1. 108.111l) (1979).
36. The District Director apparently relied upon information obtained in the per-
sonal interview, as well as answers to questions contained on the Form 1-589 asylum
claimants were required to complete. See note 48 ifra. Besides general questions
regarding the claimant's name, country of origin, and the duration of his stay, the form
contained space for the listing of any factors the alien wished the District Director to
consider. Although the claimant was allowed to present "supporting evidence," the regu-
lations did not indicate what constituted supporting evidence or the weight to be attached
to it.
37. In Haitian Refugee Center . Ciyiletrt the court decided that the District Direc-
tor's use of form letter denials contributed to the violation of the plaintifis procedural
due process rights. See Opinion, .ruprq.note 10, at 159.
38. The Haitian Refgee Center court also criticized the manner in which the asylum
applications were actually processed. The court concluded that the cumulative effect of
the procedures employed denied the aliens' due process rights. See notes 52-62 'isra and
accompanying text.
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If an alien submitted his claim for asylum after his deportation
hearing had commenced, the regulations required the Immigration
Judge 9 to suspend the hearing and permit the District Director to
consider the merit of the claim.40 If the District Director granted the
request the Immigration Judge did not reconvene the deportation
hearing.4' If the District Director denied the asylum claim, the hear-
ing was reconvened.4 2
C. THE PROGRAM
In the summer of 1978. INS officials viewed a backlog of Hai-
tian asylum claims at the Miami District Office as a serious problem
that merited immediate action.4 3 The INS therefore decided to
assign more personnel to the Miami District Office and to accelerate
the processing of Haitian asylum claims.
To implement its Haitian Program,"- the INS authorized several
significant changes in its regular operating procedure. It instructed
the Immigration Judges immediately to issue orders to "show cause"
for all Haitians, thus commencing the deportation process.4 5 Fore-
going normal procedure,4 the Immigration Judges found the Hai-
tians deportable and then ordered them to file asylum claims with
39, The term immigration judgen is interchangeable with the term "special inquiry
officer." Immigration Judges are not judicial officers in the regular sense of the word:
they function strictly within the purview of the office of the Commissioner of the INS.
They are authorized to determine deportability or to order temporary withholding of
deportation under § 243(h) of the 1952-Act. 8 C.F.R. § 242.8(a) (1981).
40, 0.1. 108.1f(2) (1979).
41. The Immigration Judge was requested to terminate the proceedings and the alien
Was granted voluntary departure increments of a year withpermission to work. Id
42. 8 C.F.R. § 108.3 (1979). Neither the statute nor the regulations indicate what
effect denial of asylum had or should have had on an alien's deportation hearing.
43. Opinion, supra note 10. at 124-26. By June of 1978 over six thousand Haitian
asVlum claims had not been processed. Id at 124.
44 -Haitian Program" (Program) was used to describe the system that the INS
deNeloped to dispose of the backlog of Haitian asylum claims. The Program is discussed
in the Opinion. supra note 10. at 124-38.
45. An order to "show cause" normally begins a deportation process. 8 C.F.R.
§ 242.1(a) (1981) provides: "Every proceeding to determine the deportability of an alien
in the United States is commenced by the issuance and service of an order to show cause
by the Service.'"-,An order to show cause includes
a concise statement of factual allegations informing the respondent of the act or
conduct alleged to be in violation of the law, and a designation of the charges
against the respondent and of the statutory provisions alleged to have been vio-
lated. The order will require the respondent to show cause why he should not be
deported.
Id § 242.1(b).
46. The then current Operating lnstru':tions required the Immigration Judges to sus-
pend deportation hearings until asylum claims were decided. See note 40 supra and
accompanying text.
1 S YL UM PROCEDURES
the District Director within a specified period of time. 47
The Haitians who filed timely claims for asylum were subject to
additional burdensome requirements at the District Director's office.
Asylum claims had to be made on a particular form and submitted
personally to the District Director's office.4 , Claimants then had to
appear for a personal interview with a member of the District Direc-
tor's staff.4 9 Under normal conditions interviews would last for sev-
eral hours.511 During the Program, inexperienced hearing officers
conducted the interviews in less than thirty minutes.5 After the
interviews, the District Director denied each of the asylum claims
and ordered the Haitians deported.
II
HAITIAN REFUGEE CENTER V CIVILETTI: THE
INS UNDER FIRE
Haitian Refugee Center v. Civileti 52 was a class action suit filed
on behalf of over four thousand Haitian refugees in the Miami, Flor-
ida area. The court's review of the INS's handling of the Haitian
situation serves as a scathing attack on the INS administration and
its operations.5-
47. Opinion, supra note 10, at 126-27. The period lasted anywhere from 10 to 30
days. If they missed this deadline, the Haitians had ten days to apply for withholding of
deportation. This time limit accorded with time limits set by the regulations. See 8
C.F.R. § 242.17(c) (1979). If the Haitians missed the second deadline, the INS instructed
the Immigration Judges to issue orders for immediate deportation.
48. The regulations and Operating Instructions required all aliens to file a Form I-
589 when seeking asylum. 0.1. 108.1 (1979). A Form 1-589 asks such questions as these:
"If you return to your country for what specific reasons do you believe you will be perse-
cuted?": "If you base your claims for asylum on current conditions in your country, do
these conditions affect your freedom more tharr the rest of that country's population?";
and "Has your request for asylum become known to the authorities of your home coun-
try?"
49. Completion of the Form 1-589 and the personal interview were regularly
required for all asylum claimants. 0.1. 108.1 (1979).
50. Opinion, supra note 10. at 152.
51. Id at 152-53.
52. See Opinion, note 10 supra. The named defendants were Benjamin Civiletti,
Attorney General of the United States; Edmund Muskie, Secretary of State; David Cros-
land, Acting Commissioner of the INS; Raymond Morris. District Director of the INS,
District Office Number 6 (Miami).
The Haitians alleged sixteen causes of action. Cause of action I alleged that the Immi-
gration Judges refused to suspend deportation hearingj.upon the filing of the Haitians'
asylum claims in contravention of 0.1. 108.1 f(2). Causes of action 2 and 3 alleged that
the plaintiffs' constitutional rights were violated by actions that the Immigration Judges
had taken. The other 13 causes of action pertain to the District Director's individual role
in the Haitian Program.
53. Before the court could reach the merits of the complaint, the defendants chal-
lenged the court's jurisdiction and the justiciability of the action. The Immigration and
Nationality Act vests jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of deportation in the
Courts of Appeal. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 106, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)
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The court first concluded that the Haitians were subject to per-
secution in Haiti5 4 and that the INS had violated their rights to pro-
cedural due process in the United States throughout the ,asylum
claim process.5 5 It held that all aliens are entitled to a fair hearing,
regardless of the merits of their individual claims. "Economic refu-
gees do not have fewer procedural rights than political refugees, just
as a criminal defendant's procedural rights are not altered by his
guilt or innocence."5
(197f,) The District Court exercised jurisdiction notwithstanding § 1105a4a). believing
that the plaintiffs would be denied their substai')ive rights of review if the class action
suit was broken down and the Haitians were left to pursue their appeals individually.
Sre Opinion. supra note 10. at 14-20. The court also concluded that since it was not
rc' iewing a -final order of deportation." jurisdiction in the district court would not vio-
late the language of the statute. Id at 17.
The defendants raised several justiciability issues. At the outset, the court indicated
that the policy considerations that underlie the justiciability doctrine could not be
ad.anced in the present case. The court explained that the doctrine was designed to
prevent a court from prematurely exercising jurisdiction or making judgments in cases
that ,ere not properly before the court. In the instant case, however. -[the] allegations
are so troubling that not to reach .the ments of this case would be an exercise in judicial
abdication rather than judicial ?'straint." Id. at 2 1.
The court then addressed each justiciability issue. The defendants first alleged that the
action was moot since the Attorney General had issued new asylum regulations in April
1979 Noting that the new regulations were not retroactive to the time when the plain-
liifs" cause of action arose, the court held that forcing the plaintiffs to proceed under the
new regulations would deprive them of their right to have the District Director consider
their application. Moreover, the new regulations could not change the fact that the
plaintiffs then faced imminent deportation. Finally, the defendants failed to demonstrate
that the new regulations could prevent a recurrence of the alleged abuse. Id at 20-25.
The defendants next argued that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative rem-
edics. The court characterized the exhaustion requirement as a discretionary judicial
tool and concluded that it did not apply. Id at 30-31. Finally. the defendants argued
that the Haitian Refugee Center lacked standing to allege a denial of its first amendment
right to free speech. The court termed the argument -'frivolous." Id at 38.
54. After discounting a Department of State report indicating Haitians were not mis-
treated, the court found that Haitians were subject to persecution up 3n their return to
Haiti The 180 page opinion includes numerous first-person accounts of terror and tor-
ture in the Haitian prison network and of brutality by the security forces of the Duvalier
regime The court concluded that repression of opposition, speech, and competitive eco-
nomics was a dominant force in Haiti. Id at 40-123.
Plaintiffs' attorneys asked the court to make the detailed findings available to other
Haitians so they could utilize them to support subsequent asylum claims. Department of
Justice attorneys argued that the studies constituted impermissible judicial review of
agency action. See N.Y. Times, May 8. 1980. at A13. col. 1.
55. The court traced the Haitians' rights to the Constitution (U.S. CONST. amend. V).
statutes (Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 202(a). 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a) (1976)
(prohibits discrinination in the granting of visas on the basis of "race, sex, nationality.
place of birth, or place of residence."); international agreements (Article 33 of the United
Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, note 9 supra); INS asylum regula-
tions (8 C.F.R. § 108 (1978)); and Operating Instructions (0.1. 108.1f(2)).
56. Opinion. supra note 10, at 127-28. Regarding the procedural violations, the court
concluded that "[tihe net result of these defects was that Haitians were unable to ade-
quately present their claims for asylum, and were deprived of full and fair consideration
of that [sic] which they did present." Id at 139.
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The court then criticized the fact that the INS disregarded its
Operating Instructions by instructing the Immigration Judges to
make findings of deportability before the aliens could claim asy-
lum.5 7 The Immigration Judges' requirement that the Haitians sub-
mit their claims within a fixed pericd after the deportation hearing
ended -"' served to deprive aliens of their right to a fair hearing as
well as to effective representation of counsel.59
The court also noted that, while asylum interviews were con-
ducted pursuant to INS regulations, the hearing officers were fre-
quently inexperienced and unfamiliar with Haiti's culture, economy,
and politics. 60 The evidence showed that, in their ignorance, the
hearing officers imposed an unreasonably" high burden of proof on
the Haitians. 61 Because the Haitians could not comply with the
officers' evidentiary demands, they were summarily denied asylum. 62
In sum, the court's investigation of the Haitians' experience
revealed gross faults within the INS-some particular to the Haitian
57. Id at 126-27. See 0.1. 108.lf(2). A criminal defendant's due process rights
would be clearly violated if he was presumed guilty until proven innocent. The court
reasoned by analogy that the Haitians were denied due process when the INS decided to
adjudge them deportable before they could appear before the District Director to submit
their asylum applications. In this posture, the aliens' fate was entirely in the Immigration
Judges' hands. If the asylum application was denied, the alien faced immediate deporta-
tion unless he applied for, and was granted. withholding of his deportation. See note 26
supra and accompanying text.
58. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
59. Opinion, supra note 10, at 144. The accelerated proceedings, in which thousands
of asylum claims were disposed of. created enormous scheduling conflicts for the Hai-
tians' attorneys. The evidence showed that only a few attorneys in Miami represented
most of the Haitians. The court could not conclude that the Haitians were denied the
assistance of counsel. but it did conclude they were deprived of the effective representa-
tion of counsel. Id at 150.
The evidence also showed, however, that the INS tried to contact local bar associations
to recruit local counsel in Miami when the Service" anticipated an increased volume of
immigration work. As the INS reported, it would be cumbersome to tailor INS activity
to the needs of a handful of attorneys. The bar must recognize this situation and work to
develop its own solutions.
60. Id at 153-57. The court recognized that the tone of the interviews and the atti-
tudes of the interviewers were manifestations of a program that placed a premium on
speed. The court faulted the INS for giving uninformed, inexperienced personnel the
task of evaluating the merits of the asylum claims. In the court's judgment, a hearing
officer should be completely familiar with the culture, economy, and politics of the coun-
tries from which aliens flee. Id
61. The court suggested that considering the Haitians' circumstances, the INS should
have lightened their burden of proof. The Haitians were expected to prove they were
subject to persecution in'Haiti in the course of a 30-minute interview conducted by per-
sons unfamiliar with conditions in Haiti. The fact that nearly all of the asylum claims
were classified as "clearly lacking in substance" indicates that only a few out of the
thousands of Haitians who were processed through the Program were able to meet the
INS's standards of evidentiary prc:of. Id at 154-57.
62. Plaintifls Exhibit 393 provides a copy of INS records indicating, on a weekly
basis from September 1979 to May 1980, the disposition of asylum claims. Of the 1404
claims submitted the INS denied all but 15. Id at 123.
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Program and some inherent in any asylum procedure. The need for
reform was clear.
III
1980 ASYLUM REGULATIONS: OUTLINE
AND EVALUATION
Following the Haitian Refugee (enter decision and upon con-
gressional request. 63 the Attorney General issued asylum regulations
in June 1980.- Coupled with the 1979 regulations, 65 the newest reg-
ulations curb some potential for di'zretionary abuse. The current
regulatory scheme remains unsatisfactory, however, since it permits
officials to exercise unchecked and unstructured discretionary pow-
ers.',
63 See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
64 45 Fed, Reg 37.392 (1980) (codified in 8 C.F.R § 208 (1981)). As noted above. it
%%a% not until March 1980 that Congress statutonly acknowledged refugees* rights to asy-
lum in the United States. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
65 In Apnl 1979 the Attorney General issued asylum regulations that substantially
altered the then current regulations. See notes 29-42 supra and accompanying text. 44
Fed Reg 21.253 (1979). Under-the pre-1979 regulations. the District Director had exclu-
sive junsdiction over all asylum applications regardless of when the alien submitted the
claim Under the 1979 regulations. the District Director had exclusive jurisdiction only
o'er asylum claims filed before an alien's deportation hearing commenced. Thereafter.
the Immigration Judge handled claims filed while the deportation or exclusion hearing
was In progress 8 C.F.R. § 108.3 (1980). The objective in revising the rcgulations in this
way was to provide applicants for political asylum with a full evidentiary hearing. See
44 Fed. Reg. 21.254 (1980).
The 1979 regulations specified an alien's burden of proof before the Immigration
Judge: "The applicant for asylum has the burden of satisfying the immigration judge
that he would be subject to persecution on account of race. religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group. or political opinion, as claimed." 8 C.F.R. § 108.3(a)
(1980) (emphasis added). The new 1980 regulations substantially lessen an alien's bur-
den
The burden is on the asylum applicant to establish that he/she is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of
the protection of the country of such person's nationality. . . because of perse-
cution or a well-foundedfear of persecution on account of race. religion, nation-
ality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.
45 Fed. Reg. 37.394 (1980) (codified in 8 C.F.R. §208.5 (1981)) (emphasis added). The
new burden of proof language incorporates the United Nations' expansive definition of
"refugee" as "Ialny person who.. .owing to well-foundedfear of being persecuted ...
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or. owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country." Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees. done July 28. 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6260. T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 as
amended b; Protocol. supra note 9, art. 1, A(2). In 1979. the INS took the position that
there is no fundamental difference between the two forrnnlations. See 44 Fed. Reg.
21.257 (1979). The alien's burden is the same whether the District Director or the Immi-
gration Judge receives the claim.
66. At this j incture the author commends to the reader K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSICE. A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). Davis examines the growing phenomenon of
widescale administrative discretionary power by describing its structure and confines.
Davis recognizes that some administrative discretion is necessary:
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A. DISTRICT DIRECTOR'S ROLE
Although the new regulations alter the District Director's role in
the asylum procedures, he continues to enjoy broad discretionaiy
powers!" The regulations still lack necessary guidelines regarding
matters of procedural form as well as substantive decisionmaking.
1. Personal Intervew
If an alien submits his application for asylum before his depor-
tation or exclusion hearing has commenced, 68 he must appear before
the District Director for a personal interview. 6 9 This directive is
silent about such administrative guidelines as the length of the inter-
view, nature of the questions asked, or qualifications of the hearing
officer. 70 The evidence brought out in Haitian Refugee Center
demonstrated how discretion afforded the INS at this stage of the
procedure could be misused. 7' Recognizing that it would be inap-
propriate for the Attorney General to attempt to exercise too much
control over the daily operation of the INS, alternatives short of total
abandonment of control are certainly feasible.72
Discretion is a tool, indispensable for individualization of justice. All govern-
ments in history have been governments of laws and of men. Rules alone.
untempered by discretion, cannot cope with the complexities of modern govem-
ment and of modern justice. Discretion is our principal source of creativeness in
government and in law.
Id at 25.
Davis's thesis is that only unnecessary discretionary power should be eliminated. But
the necessary discretionary power should be properly confined, structured, and checked.
67. The regalations provide in part: "'The district director may approve or deny the
asylum application in the exercise of discretion.'- 45 Fed. Reg. 37.394 (1980) (codified in
8 C.F.R. § 208.8(a) (1981)). Further, the director's decision is not appealable. Id
§ 208.8(c).
68. In a deportation hearing, the burden of establishin$g deportability is on the INS.
while in exclusion proceedings the burden of proving admissibility is upon the applicant
for admission. For a comparison of deportation proceedings with exclusion proceedings.
see E. HARPER, iupra note 1, at 622. See also note 5 supra.
69. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,394 (1980) (codified in 8 C.F.R. § 208.6 (1981)). This section
simply provides: "The applicant shall be examined in person by an immigration officer
or judge prior to adjudication of the asylum application."
70. Guidelines governing such details should not be so stringent as to hamper offi-
cials in efficiently performing their functions. See note 66 supra. Some guidelines are
nevertheless necessary. See notes 92-99 infra and accompanying text.
71. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
72. For example, the Attorney General could require each District Director to obtain
clearance from senior INS officials before changing any aspect of the normal procedure.
He could also require directors to put aliens on notice of any impending changes. Each
District Office could notify aliens by informing the local immigration bar and by publish-
ing the information in local newspapers.
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2 BHRHA Opinion
Upon receipt of an asylum application, the District Director
must request an advisory opinion from the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA) of the Department of State."3
The regulations do not specify the weight to be attached to the opin-
ion or how the decisionmakers should evaluate it. 74  Because the
Department of State is necessarily sensitive to different priorities and
pressures," INS decisionmakers should not blindly adopt the
Department of State's views: the District Director must be prepared
closely to scrutinize such recommendations for reliability.7 6 Regula-
tions that allow opinions of questionable merit to be admitted and
relied upon do not further an alien's interests.
3. Form of Denial
The District Director has the power to deny any asylum appli-
cation in the exercise of his discretion." The Attorney General has
never formulated guidelines governing the form or content of a
den'ial 7 The 1980 regulations still lack such guidelines: they do,
however, enumerate bases upon which the District Director must
73. 45 Fcd.Reg. 37.394 (1980)(codiiedin 8 C.F.R §208.7(1981)). Undcrth179
regulations. the Distnct Director was required to request the views of the Department of
State before making his decision unless, in his opinion, the application was clearly meri-
tonous or clearly lacking in substance. 8 C.'.R. § 108.2 (1980). Under those same regu-
lations, the docket clerk of the Immigration court sent two copies of the asylum
application with supporting evidence to the BHRHA. The regulation required the Immi-
gration Judge to stay consideration of the application for 30 days to await the Depart-
ment of State's reply. Id § 108.3.
74. The pertinent provision simply provides: 'Upon receipt of Form 1-589. the dis-
trct director shall in all cases request an advisory opinion fromrn the Bureau of Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs." 45 Fed. Reg. 37.394 (1980) (codified in 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.7 (1981)). Applicants are to be given an opportunity to inspect. explain, or rebut
the opinion only if it is included in the record. Id § 208.8(d). BHRHA opinions are to
be made part of the record if a decision is based in whole or in part on them. Id
75. INS decisionmakers must appreciate the fact that Department of State recom-
mendations are not made in a political vacuum. The Department of State officials who
respond to INS requests for information and opinions work side-by-side with employees
in other branches of the Department who have distinctly different priorities. For exam-
ple. Department of State staff members may feel pressure from their superiors and from
co-workers not to admit that persecution exists in foreign countries. Such an admission
could strain or irreparably damage relations between the United States and a foreign
nation. See Note. Behind the Paper Curtain 4sylum Polic" Versus Asylm Practice, 7
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 107. 134 (1978j.
76. The laitan Refugee Center court discounted the Department of State report that
concluded. based on a survey conducted in Haiti, that Haitians who had been denied
asylum in the United States were not mistreated or penalized upon their return to their
homeland. The court determined that the survey results were unreliable because of the
questibnable sampling methodology the Department's Task Force employed. Opinion.
supra note 10. at 57-80. See also note 8 supra and accompanying text.
77. See note 67 upra.
78. The INS uses form letter denials routinely. See note 37 supra and accompanying
text.
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deny asylum. 79 Although the regulations attempt to introduce some
certainty into the decisionmaking process,80 they do not prevent the
District Director from abusing his discretion in denying asylum on
other grounds.
B. IMMIGRATION JUDGE'S ROLE
The same infirmities that invite abuses on the part of the Dis-
trict Directors are inherent in the regulations that pertain to the
Immigration Judges.8' The 1980 regulations grant Immigration
Judges exclusive jurisdiction over the asylum claims that aliens file
during a deportation or exclusion hearing. 2 The regulations do not
specify criteria to guide Immigration'Judges' decisions. The regula-
tions impose'requirements upon an Immigration Judge's review of
an asylum claim .(mandating a personal interview8 3 with the appli-
cant and the solicitation of a BHRHA advisory opinion) that are
similar to those that the District Director follows.84
With regard to denials of claims, the regulations provide Immi-
gration Judges with even fewer guidelines than are provided to Dis-
79 The regulation provides:
(I) General. The district director shall deny a request for asylum or extension
of asylum status if it is determined that the alien:
(i) h not a refugee within the meaning of section 101(aX4 2) of the Act;
(ii) Has been firmly resettled in a foreign country;
(iii) That the alien ordered, incited. assisted or otherwise participated in
the persecution of any person on account of race,"religion, nationality.
membership in a particular group, or political opinion;
(iv) The alien, having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of the United States;
(v) There are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed
a serious non-political crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of
the alien in the United-States.
(vi) There are reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a danger to
the security of the United States.
45 Fed. Reg. 37,394-95 (1980) (codified in 8 C.F.R. § 208.8(f) (1981)).
80. The list basically parallels grounds for deportation or exclusion in the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 212, 241, 8 U.S.C. §I 1182(a). 125 1(a). See note 5
sunpra.
81. See notes 69-76 supra and accompanying text.
82. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,394-95 (1980) (codified in 8 C.F.R. § 208.1 (1981)). The current
regulations retained this significant change that the 1979 regulations had incorporated.
Under the pre-1979 regulations, the District Director had exclusive jurisdiction over all
asylum applications regardless of when an alien submitted his claim. See note 31 supra
and accompanying text.
83. Id § 208.6.
84. Id § 208.10(b). When an asylum request is filed with an Immigration Judge, he
adjourns the exclusion or deportation hearing until he receives the BHRHA opinion.
The opinion becomes part of the record, and the applicant has an opportunity to insp-
and rebut it. If the District Director had receivca a BHRHA opinion pursuant to asylum
regulation § 208.7, the Immigration Judge shall not request another opinion, unless be
determines in his discretion that a second referral would -naturally aid in adjudication of
the asylum request,." Id
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trict Directors. The Attorney General has not, for example,
provided Immigration Judges with a comparable list of bases for
mandatory denial of asylum requests. Also lacking is guidance as to
what forms of evidence the Immigration Judge should consider, and
importantly, what weight he should attach to each. 5
It is apparent that underlying the organization, control, and
judicial character of the process, opportunities for abuse of discre-
tion persist. Answers to the following questions are apparently left
to the unfettered discretion of the appropriate officials: what factors
should be considered in deciding the merits of an asylum applica-
tion; what weight should be accorded different kinds of evidence,
such as the BHRHA opinion; and what circumstances should require
a mandator grant of asylum.
This Note demonstrates how the Haitians' experience exempli-
fies problems inherent in past INS procedures. It suggests that the
current regulatory scheme is also beset with weaknesses. The task is
great. The Haitian crisis demands immediate remedy: the INS asy-
lum procedures and structure must be revised on a broader scale to
prevent -further abuse.
IV
PROPOSALS
A. STRUCTURAL REORGANIZATION OF THE INS
The first proposal calls for a complete structural reorganization
of the INS.A' Under the present organizational format, the INS ful-
fills dual roles: enforcing the immigration laws and providing serv-
ices relating to the benefits available to eligible immigrantsA7
Studies of INS operations conclude that combining enforcement and
service responsibilities in one body is undesirable.88 If a separate,
85 The regulations do provide Immigration Judges with some guidance regarding
the kinds of evidence that may be considered. For example, the Immigration Judge may
consider nonrecord evidence, provided such information is classified in the interest of
national security under Executive Order No. 12,065. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,395 (1980) (codified
in 8 C F.R. § 208.10(c) (1981)). The regulations do not indicate what weight should be
attached to record and nonrecord evidence. The Immigration Judge need only comply
%,ith the requirement that -[a] decision based in whole or in part on non-record evidence
shall state that such evidence is matenal to the decision." d § 208.10(d).
86 Although the first and second proposals are related, as are the third and fourth.
the implementation of one proposal is not contingent upon adoption of the others.
87. See. note 7 supra. As part of its service -responsibilities. the INS provides infor-
mation to the public about immigration benefits, accepts applications from persons seek-
Ing those benefits, and determines whether the benefits will be denied or granted. The
INS's primary enforcement responsibilities involve border management functions and
deportation determinations.
88. The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights provides examples of several such studies
in UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE T.RNISHIED GOLDEN DOOR, 40-
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independent body were created to enforce immigration laws, the INS
could concentrate on fulfilling its service functions.5 9
The Immigration Judges would also be insulated from the
strong influence of the INS and the Department of State.90 They
would not be subject to INS or Department of State control in the
event decisions similar to those involved in the Haitian Program
were again made.91 Ideally, if the INS were restructured to provide
services rather than to enforce, it would have no need to initiate
other Haitian Programs. Even if the INS were to separate its service
and enforcement functions, however, it would still be necessary to
establish guidelines aimed at curbing the decisionmakers' ability to
abuse their discretion.
43 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Commission]. The Commission found that the presence of
competing alms of enforcement and service within the INS results in a disproponionate
emphasis on enforcement and a corresponding denial of services to eligible persons. It
endorses a restructuring proposal. Id
89. Under present conditions, aliens may be loath to seek information on services to
which they are entitled, because they are afraid of being deported: The result is that
many people are afraid to go to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, will not go
for assistance, will not go to file applications or to find out what's happened to applica-
tions, because they are then subject to expulsion proceedings. Commission. supra note
88. at 42.
90. The Haitian Refugee Center case evidences Immigration Judges* susceptability to
manipulation. The chief Immigration Judge was involved from the earliest planning
stages of the program. Opinion. supra note 10. at 124-38. See also notes 37-38 & 57-58
supra and accompanying text.
The bureaucratic hierarchy of the INS helps to explain the strong influence the District
Director may exercise over Immigration Judges. Although the Immigration Judge is the-
oretically responsible only to the INS (commissioner, he is subject to the budgetary and
administrative control of the District Director. See E. HARPER, supra note I. at 62-64. It
is the District Director's responsibility to supply the Immigration Judge with office sup-
plies and support staff. Id
The District Director's present role in asylum claim processs would conceivably be
unaffected by a restructuring of the INS. The INS considers petitions and claims regard-
ing benefits available to aliens, including asylum, and claims submitted before deporta-
tion as part of its service function. See note 87 supra. That function would remain with
the INS.
91. The question arises whether Immigration Judges should hear all asylum claims.
The purpose behind revising the regulations to permit Immigration Judges the authority
to determine asylum claims filed after deportation or exclusion hearings had commenced
was to provide aliens full evidentiary hearings. See 44 Fed. Reg. 21,254 (1979). Under
the current scheme, District Directors do not conduct comparable inquiries. Advantages
of eliminating the District Director's role and granting the Immigration Judge jurisdic-
tion to hear all claims include the expectation that such an arrangement would accord
aliens full evidentiary hearings, eliminate duplication, and prevent situations like the
Haitian Program from recurring. The advantage of retaining two-tiered decisionmaking
lies in the idea that two opportunities to present asylum claims are better than one. Also.
many commentators generally object to the removal of the District Director from the
asylum claim process. See id A new two-tier procedure that would combine the District
Director's present role with the new role of the Immigration Judge could incorporate
advantages of each alternative: providing full evidentiary hearings for all asylum claims:
retaining the District Director and his support staff as the primary decisionmaker and
separating the decisionmakers from influences that could lead to abuses of discretion.
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B. REVISION OF CURRENT REGULATIONS
The independent second proposal calls for an expeditious revi-
sion of current asylum regulations. Effective asylum regulations
must structure and check INS officials' discretionary powers. 92 Spe-
cifically, the regulations should clearly set out administrative guide-
lines that will identify factors the decisionmaker should consider
when passing on the merits of each asylum application.
The guidelines should not be so restrictive as to hamper deci-
sionmakers' discretionary authority, yet they must impose minimal
standards to ensure sufficient uniformity in the processing of
claims.93 The Attorney General should determine what weight deci-
sionmakers may give to the BHRHA advisory opinions94 to ensure
that the District Directors and the Immigration Judges do not accord
them undue weight or treat them as conclusive." Further, an
enumeration of mandatory bases for the grant of asylum9 should
complement the list of mandatory bases for denial of asylum. 97 To
complete his task, the Attorney General should address the need for
structuring Immigration Judges' powers. 98 Reform in this area is
particularly crucial if the Note's first proposal, calling for a structural
reorganization of the INS, is not implemented.
Finally, the regulations should give aliens some indication of
what they are expected to present in support of their applications.
Presently, aliens are simply told they must establish that they will be
subject to persecution if forced to return to their native country. 99
92. See notes 66-85 supra and accompanying text.
93. For ciample, minimal requirements concerning an applicant's personal interview
could be formulated to provide each applicant with a hearing before a qualified exam-
iner, as well as to provide the examining officer adequate time in which to obtain suffi-
cient information. A requisite minimal length of an interview could be established,
based upon the average time present decisionmakers consider appropriate. Qualifica-
tions of the examining officer could also be set forth to ensure a minimal level of exper-
tise or competence in evaluating the merit of applicants* claims. Such qualifications
could similarly be based on decisionmakers' past experiences regarding what qualifica-
tions they consider most desirable.
94. See notes 73-76 .s/pra and accompanying text.
95. Sections 208.7 and 208.10(b) of the regulations could be revised to indicate that
the opinion is strictly idvisory and that in no case may it be considered conclusive. The
regulations already require the Immigration Judges to give applicants the opportunity to
inspect. explain. and rebut BHRHA opinions. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,395 (1980) (codified in 8
C.F.R.§ 208.0(b) (1981)).
96. See note 79 supra.
97. Under the current regulations, the list of bases for denial applies only to the
District Director, a similar-list does not bind the Immigration Judge. See text accompa-
nying note 85 suow. A list of such bases for mandatory denial, supplemented by a list of
bases for mandatory grants of asylum, should be set forth for the Immigration Judge as
well.
98. See notes 82-85 supra and accompanying text.
99. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
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The third proposal addresses this concern.
C. PREPARATION OF NATIONAL REPORTS
In order to be granted asylum, an alien must prove that he
would be subject to persecution or that he has a well-founded fear of
persecution if he were forcibly returned to his native country.1co In
Haitian Refugee Center . Civilett4 the court was disturbed by evi-
dence that INS officials placed an onerous burden of production on
Haitian asylum applicants to prove that persecution exists in
Haiti.1'0
That burden could be substantially lessened if aliens had access
to reports that would comprehensively and accurately detail condi-
tions in the countries from which they seek refuge. Such reports
could be prepared and updated annually and made available to an
alien upon his application for asylum. While the report would not
be conclusive on the issue whether aliens from a particular country
are subject to persecution, it would serve as a formal statement on
general conditions within particular countries.'0 2
Not only would annual reports lessen an applicant's burden of
production of important "background" information, they would per-
mit him additional time to collect evidence of personal persecution
experiences. 0 3 Use of a national report would also prevent unfair
dispositions of claims that might occur when one individual has
access to more complete evidence of his country's internal conditions
than does another alien. The availability of a national report would
thereby facilitate individualized consideration of each asylum claim.
An act of Congress would not be necessary to implement this
proposal. The Attorney General can amend the asylum regulations
to provide for presentation of the appropriate report to the deci-
sionmaker and to each alien who submits an asylum application.
The Attorney General may delegate the task of preparing national
reports to presently employed INS personnel or to a permanent task
force charged with'the responsibility.
100. Id
101. Opinion, supra note 10, at 156. See also note 62 supra and accompanying text.
102. Such reports would be current assessments of the country's political, economic,
and social conditions and would supplement the advisory opinions that the dei-
sionmaker must request from the Department of State. 45 Fed. Reg. 37,394-95 (1980)
(codified in 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.7, 208.10(b) (1981)). See notes 73-76 supra and accompany-
ing text. Aliens from countries like Haiti, where persecution may not be readily apparent
either because it occurs privately or because it involves emotional rather than physical
abuse, will particularly benefit from the reports.
103. The current Operating Instructions permit asylum claimants to present any evi-
dence they feel tends to substantiate their claims or fears of persecution. 0.1. 208.8(c)
(1980).
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I). PERMANENT TASK FORCE ON REFUGEE POLICY
Congre.,,,, has often recognized the need for in-depth, widescale
studies of the immigration field.' °4 The formation of a permanent
task force to perform such studies would fulfill functions that
become more critical with each influx of refugees. The Task Force
can provide the national reports'05 and recommend how asylum
claims from each nation should be handled.1° 6 It can also serve as
an ombudsman 0 7 in monitoring the enforcement procedures of the
INS. A leading authority on administrative law has strongly
encouraged the use of ombudsman systems as a technique to check
administrative discretionary power and to protect against arbitrari-
ness. I"N
A Permanent Task Force on Refugee Policy should ideally be
composed of individuals representing politics, religious groups, labor
organizations. immigration law practitioners, and academics.2°9 In
the interests of stability and continuity the President and Congress
should jointly appoint the Task Force members for a fixed term of
three-to-five years.' ° The terms should begin at staggered times to
1114 The formation of vanous commissions to serve and critique the immigration field
supports this assertion. Each commission concluded its task by making recommenda-
tions and proposals. some of which resulted in the enactment of new legislation. In 1978.
the Precident formed a Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to pro-
,ide a comprehensisce study of the United States immigration system. The Commission's
repon to the Congress is due by March 1. 1981. The Commission's charter is contained
in Pub L. 95-412. § 4. as amended bi Pub. L. 96-132. § 23. 93 Stat 1051 (Nov. 30. 1979).
See I R. Rt:P. No. 1206. 95th Cong.. 2d Sess. 8. reorintedin [1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
At) Ntws 2261. 2268.
105 See notes 100-03 supra and accompanying text.
106 Being a neutral, objective body. tangential considerations of foreign policy or
prejudice would not blind the Task Force; it could scale national barriers to detect viola-
tions of human, religious, or political rights.
1I7. An ombudsman is a high-level-officer whose main functions are to receive com-
plaints from citizens, investigate and evaluate the complaints, and publicize his findings.
Being independent of the agency or service an administrative ombudsman is investigat-
ing. he has the advantage of distance from the source of the agency or service's power.
Se-e eneraJ/I- K DAvIs. DISCRETtONARY JUSTICE. A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 150 (1969).
108 See id at 150-51. Davis emphasizes that an ombudsman system should be used
Js a supplement to. and not a substitute for, competent administration and fair judicial
reiew of administrative action. Davis shows that the ombudsman system has worked
well in several foreign countnes. For example. his research reveals that the mere exist-
ence of.-ombudsmen in Britain gives administrators added incentiveto avoid injustice
and to correct maladministration. Id
109. The variety of views that could thereby be represented would render the INS a
more responsive and humanitarian organization. The recent public outrage over the offi-
cial handling of the Haitian crisis bespeaks the wide gulf that must be bridged between
public sentiment and expectations on the one hand and official policy and action on the
other.
110. The term should be long enough to enable the member thoroughly to familiarize
himself with the field, but not so long that he becomes bored. stale, or loses his perspec-
tive as an objective observer.
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avoid the inefficiency that would result if the Task Force were com-
pletely restaffed periodically.
Congress should grant the Task Force the power to issue sub-
poenas so witnesses and documents are available at public hearings
it may conduct."' The Task Force should be required to appear
annually before Congress to report on its activities and to receive
legislative directives and suggestions.
Disadvantages of this proposal include the facts that the Task
Force members may still be constrained as government representa-
tives from harshly criticizing other governments' policies" 1 2 and that
formation of a Permanent Task Force would require congressional
authorization. "13
CONCLUSION
Our nation has had a sterling reputation for welcoming foreign-
ers. We must not let that reputation become tarnished. Our immi-
gration service is under severe attack, both at home and abroad, for
pursuing ends that conflict with the well-settled traditions and the
widely held sentiments of the American public. Today, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service is under pressure to account for
its policies, methods, and tactics. The pressure comes from Ameri-
can citizens, aliens, courts, and finally the Congress.
The Haitian Refugee Center case revealed fundamental weak-
nesses in INS asylum procedures. The court's "scathing attack
renewed criticism of the INS for permitting and encouraging abuses
of its administrative discretionary powers.
At this time, interested groups, agencies, the judiciary, and Con-
gress should unite in a spirit of cooperation to work towards com-
mon goals of reform in asylum procedures. Congress should
Il l. The Task Force should also be authorized to commission studies and conduct
tours of foreign countries. Because it would be an entity independent of the INS and the
Department of State, its budget would not be dependent upon those organizations'
finances.
112. Task Force members could interject opinions and observations free of the con-
straints imposed on other government employees, such as those in the Department of
State. But because the Task Force would be operating under the auspices of the U.S.
Government, it should be sensitive to possible ramifications should its studies prove to be
highly critical c f another government.
113. Congressional authorization is a time-consuming process, even when the legisla-
ture is favorably disposed to a piece of legislation. The November 4, 1980 elections
swept into power a conservative Republican President and turned the leadership of pow-
erful Senate Committees over to Republicans. Chairmanship of the Senate Judiciary
Committee passed from Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D.-Mass.). a vigorous advocate of
immigration law reform, to conservative Republican Strom Thurmond (R.-S.C.). The
election results indicate that proposals for immigration reform and the final report of the
Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (see note 104 supra) will be con-
sidered by a more conservative, economy-minded Congress.
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particularly seize the moment and institute the recommended
reforms. Such an initiative will make the INS a more responsive
agency at home and will help the country regain its international
reputation as a leading advocate and protector of human rights.
Yictoria L. Potelicki
